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The impact of the Remuneration Act, 1979-1980 
Karen Roper* 
This ,article outlines the history of the Remuneration Act and Regulations, 1979-80, 
and explores their immediate economic, industrial relations, political and constitutional 
implications. It is argued that the Government introduced the Act to facilitate its manipu-
lation of the ~economic, political and industrial relations systems. Instead, because of their 
nature and the way they we~e applied, the Act and R~egulations chal/en~ed 11Uln.v of the 
principles on which these systems are based. This p.,ovoked reactions which ,ensured that 
the Act not only failed to achieve the ~Government's goals, but proved to be counter-
productive. 
• 
'The Remune.,ation Act deserves consideration. It was ushered into the living rooms of 
the nation by the Prime Minister himself; it provoked the general strike of 1979 and pro-
lon,ged the 198'0 K.inleith dispute; it stimulated the frrst period of intense confli~ct between 
the Government and unions in New ,Zealand's history which did not leave the union move-
ment w~eakened and demo.ralized; it ,gave th~ unions two causes for celebration in one year. 
A Brief Hist~ory 
On 6 July 1979 the Federation of Labour lodged with the Arbitration Court an applica-
tion for a minimum living wage order in te1n1s of the General Wage Orders Act, 1977. On 
24 July, before the ap.plication had been heard by the ~Court, the Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, announced, in a simultaneous television and radio broadcast, that the Govern-
ment intended to repeal th~e General Wage Orders Act, issue a general increase of 4.5 per-
cent and ~empower itself to regulate specific wages and conditions. The Remune~ation A~ct 
was 'introduced into Parliament on 27 July and became law on 10 August. Under it, regula-
tions could be issued for two purposes: to make general adjustments to wages and to set 
wage rates and conditions for specific groups of workers. Two Remuner:ation (General 
Increase) R~egulations were issued under the Act. The frrst provided for a 4.5 percent 
general incfiease effective from 3 September 1979; the se~cond, a four percent general 
increase from 1 August 1980. 
On four occasions Remuneration Regulations were threatened or used to intervene in 
award settlements. Th~e first in,volved the general drivers' award. After three months of 
negotiations broken by strike action, the New Zealand Drivers' Federation and the Road 
Transport Association reached agreement on an II percent basic wage increase with 
additional allowances. Before the agreement was finalized, the Prime Minister warned that 
the Government would issue R~emuneration Regulations to reduce the basic increase to 
9.5 percent and would ensure that the employers could not pass the settlement on in 
increased charges (foreshadowing the Commerce Amendment Bill introduced on 18 
September 1'979). The Fed~eration of Labour responded by calling a general strike on 
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2~ ~eptember. After four days of uncertainty following the strike, a suggestion from the 
M~mster of Labour, Jim Bolger, that the case should go to arbitration was accepted by the 
drivers. The Government undertook to accept the Court's decision ~ather than issue 
Remuneration Regulations. On 5 October the Arbitration Court announced an award 
which gave the drivers virtually what their employers had conceded a month earlier but in 
a different form. ' 
The second intervention was the issuing without warning on 12 October of the Remuner-
ation (Aucklllnd, Canterbury, Westlllnd and Hawke~ Bay Bulk Freight Forwarrlers (Stores) 
E,mployees Award) xegu/lltions 1979 (referred to here as the freight forwarders' 
regulations). The primary purpose was to alter an agreement, reached early in October 
after sporadic industrial action dating back to December 1978 for a new allowance of 
. ' $6.40 per week for the handling of dangerous chemicals. The rest of the award was due to 
be decided in conciliation on 29 October. The Regulations pre~mpted this, establishing 
basic increases in the award at the trend rate for the wage round - 10.4 percent. The 
chemical handling allowance was reduced to $1.80 per week. After initial protests the 
Federation of Labour decided on 25 October not to take further action in response to the 
reduction of the allowance, and the freight forwarders themselves fmally accepted it in 
November 1979. 
The third intervention came on 26 February 1980 with the signing of the Remuneration 
(New Zealand Engine Driven, Boiler Attendllnts, Firemen and Greaen AMIIU'd) 
Regulations 1980 (referred to here as the engine drivers' regulations). Again these followed 
bouts of direct action over a period of several months, this time in support of a registration 
allowance. The Regulations prohibited the introduction of new provisions into the award, 
thereby preventing registration allowances from being included. The level of wages for the 
award was not set by regulation. 
The final use of Remuneration Regulations to alter a wage settlement was the Remuner-
ation (New Zealand Forest Products) Regulations, 1980 (referred to here as the Kinleith 
regulations) which applied to all unions at the New Zealand Forest Products mill at 
Kinleith, Tokoroa, except the pulp and paper workers. After eight weeks of strike action, 
the company had agreed to the combined union claim for parity with rates paid at the 
Tasman Pulp and Paper Company's mill at Kawerau. The 20.5 percent increase which this 
gave to Kinleith workers restored relativities lost when Tasman workers' rates moved ahead 
of Kinleith's in the 1978-79 wage round. The Government objected to the size of the 
proposed increase, arguing that the combined unions should have pairty with pulp and 
paper workers who had settled· for 18 percent in January 1980. Accordingly, regulations 
were signed on 3 March which gave the combined unions an 18 percent increase. The 
strik~ continued with strong support from the Federation of Labour and other unions 
until the Government agreed to withdraw the regulations. On 26 March, the RevOCtltion 
of Remuneration (New Zealand Forest Products) Regullltiom, 1980, were signed, restoring 
the settlement to that reached on 24 February. 
As one of the conditions for the withdrawal of the Kinleith regulations, the Federation 
of Labour agreed to take part in tripartite wage policy discussions which began on 24 
April. During May, the Federation of Labour and the Combined State Unions initiated a 
campaign in defence of living standards, demanding a restoration of regular general wage 
orders, an immediate cost-of-living adjustment and the repeal of the Remuneration Act. 
The tripartite talks produced an interim accord for the 1980-81 wage round on 
6 August. In return for a 'reasonable' wage settlement in the round, the Government agreed 
that the Remuneration Act would be repealed and the Arbitration Court could hear a 
case for a general cost-of-living adjustment to wages. The Remuneration Act Repet~l BiB 
received its first reading on 14 August 1980, and, after a nationwide television and radio 
broadcast by the Prime Minister, announcing the reasons for the Act's repeal, t~ 
Remuneration Act was signed out of existence on 4 November 1980. 
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The Remuneration Act as an Instrument of Wages Policy 
All New Zealand governments since 1971 have adopted a variety of wage strategies to 
curb inflation (Martin, 1981 .• p.S) and to control the wage fixing process (Walsh, 1979, 
pp.l 3 and 15). Direct wage controls were used between 1971 and 1977. There was a return 
to a general wage order syst~em and freer bargaining between 1977 and 1979. This was 
abandoned in favour of a policy of selective intervention ~enshrined in the Remuneration 
Act, before tripartite talks were tried in 1980 and 1981 (Martin, pp.S-7). This article 
considers the Remunderation Act in this context, leaving aside the qu·estion of whose 
economic interests the Government was seeking to serve by the Act. 
The Minister of Labour's speeches during August 1979 r~eveal the pragmatism of the 
Gove.mment's approach. Bolger rejected a system in which the Government played no role 
in wage fixing as inoperable in New Zealand because the protected sector of the economy 
could pass on ·wage increases but the ,export sector could not. At the other extreme, the 
Government had lost faith .in wage controls also. Between 1971 and 1977 these had com-
pressed margins for skill, distorted relativities, hardened attitudes between employers and 
workers and by 1976 contributed to the highest level of industrial activity for two decad~es. 
Wage controls were seen as inflexible, and capable of evasion. Accordingly, the Govern-
ment had lifted controls and reintroduced the general wage order system in 1977, on the 
understanding that wage bargaining would be "socially responsible". But by 1979 it was 
disillusioned with this policy too, because it believed that many unions were obtaining 
excessive wage settlements or receiving double compensation for inflation. 
Through the R,e,munet7ation Act, the Minister said, the Government was looking for 
a different path to "responsible fr,ee wage bargaining"., which would encourage the settle-
ment of wage disputes without industrial action., at levels ~consist~ent with the interests of 
the economy and the ~community, yet enable the Government to intervene if this did not 
occur. 
From the outset the Government said that it was possible that the R,emuneration Act 
would be an interim measure, the duration depending on the outcome of talks it hoped to 
hold with employers and trade unions about new methods of wage fixing. This essentially 
pragmatic approach helps to explain why the Government was prepared to abandon the 
A~ct in 1980, in exchange for tripartite wage talks. 
There ·were two wage fixing components to the Remuneration Act. The first was pro-
vision for the establishment of general increases by regulation; the second the introduction 
of a policy of selective intervention in wage fixing. Direct government determination of 
general increases is not new. Economic Stabilisation Regulations provided wa,ge orders 
in August 1'973 and February 1974, as did Wage Adjustment Regulations from 1974 to 
1977. 
The catalyst for repeal of the 1977 general wage order system was the Federation of 
Labour's application for a minimum living wage order. Government members expressed 
fears that this would lead to more unemployment, a more rigid labour market and massive 
wage rises. They asserted that the Arbitration Court was an inappropriate forum and the 
general ·wage order an inappropriate mechanism for dealing with the needs of low income 
earners. 
Avowing its continued faith in th,e Arbitration Court as an institution for r~esolving 
industrial disputes, the Government removed the general wage order function from the 
Court. Under the R~emune~ation Act the ~Government had absolut~e power to decide 
whether to provide for a general increase in rates of remuneration. No criteria were 
established for detennining the timing or level of any increases. The system seemed to give 
the Government both flexibility and control. In deciding the level of general increases~ it 
could gmnt just enough to fuel inflation. This suited the Government's "fme tuning" 
approa,ch to the economy. When repealing the R,emuneratiun Act, it therefore ignored 
union pleas for a restoration of the general wage order system, and retained the right to 
I 
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issue general increase regulations under the Economic St11bilillltion Act, 1948. 
This raises the question whether the second component of the Remuneration Act - the 
provision empowering the Government to alter particular wages and conditions - was 
either new or necessary, given the existence of the Economic Stabilistztion Act. The policy 
of selective intervention predated the Remunemtion Act. In April 1979 the Minister of 
Labour threatened to cancel an agreement giving freight forwarders an allowance for 
handling dangerous chemicals, because twelve months had not elapsed since the previous 
award. The Government also twice issued regulations under the Economic Stabilisation 
Act to alter awards (The Economic StabiliSiltion (Meat Processors' Packers' and Prese111ers' 
Award) Regukztions, 1978 and the Economic StabiliSiltion (Remuneration of Sea-going 
Engineers) Regukztions, 1979). This suggests that ~ction 4(4) of the Remuneration Act, 
which enabled regulations to be applied to specific groups of workers, may have been 
unnecessary. But, in fact, these Economic Stabilisation Regulations probably exceeded the 
powen given ~e Government in the Economic Stabilillltion Act. As Lance Adams-
Schneider said during the debate on the Commerce Amendment Bill: 
The advice I have received ... is that the Economic StabiliSiltion Act is a 
measure that the Government can confidently use. . . to introduce regulations 
for price freezes, wage controls and other facets of stabilisation over a broad 
economic front, but that it is not an appropriate measure under which to take 
action in an individual case. (Hansard, 1979, p.3603). 
Now that it has been conceded by the Government that the Economic Stabilisation Act 
does not enable it to regulate to alter specific wage settlements, the repeal of the 
Remuneration Act should mark the end of this practice- at least within existing law. 
The Remuneration Act failed as an instrument of wages policy partly because there was 
a legacy of hostility between National Governments and the union movement dating back 
to 1951, fuelled by the anti-union emphasis in the party's 1975 election campaign, its 
policies of secret ballots on voluntary unionism and its introduction of penalty clauses into 
the lndustrilzl Rellltions Act in 1976. The Government had not consulted the parties before 
introducing the Remuneration Bill, and the Federation of Labour bitterly opposed the 
policies it represented. It also totally rejected the concept of the Government establishing 
guidelines for wage negotiations and many unions - especially those with considerable 
economic power - were unwilling to accept the constraints of the conciliation and arbitra-
tion system, let alone the additional restrictions of wage guidelines. The Government was 
naive to expect a wages policy to work which was so alien to the philosophy and mood of 
the union movement, yet depended so much on the co-operation of the move111ent. 
The way the Act was applied also ensured that it was ineffective as a means of 
controlling wages. If the intention was to influence the level of the award round (Martin, 
p.6), because of the absence of a wage accord the Government would have had to reduce 
every settlement which exceeded the acceptable level. It did not reduce the metal trades 
and electrical workers' increases of 10.4 percent in Septentber 1979 or the watersiden' 
settlement of 12 percent in March 1980, despite the fact that the Government had 
indicated that the acceptable increase for the 1979~ round was 9.5 percent by threaten-
ing to reduce the drivers' settlement to that level. Nor did it reduce the dairy industry's 
settlement of 14.5 percent in September 1980 although in discussions with the Federation 
of Labour in August, Bolger had stated that 13 percent would be reasonable for the 
1980-81 round. 
One reason given for use of the Act was to cut back settlements which exceeded what 
would have been negotiable without direct action. But it proved difficult to decide how 
much of an offer was a concession to strike action. The levels which the Government 
announced were acceptable in the drivers' and freight forwarders' cases therefore seemed 
entirely arbitrary. -
The Prime Minister referred to the hatntful effects on wage levels if the Kinleith settle-
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ment tlo'w,ed on to the Auckland cor·e tradesmen's rates, and justified the regulations as an 
effort to prevent this. But in ord·er to prevent such a flow-on from timber workers' settle-
ments, the Government would also have had to reduce the Tasman and Caxton agreements 
which were identical to that reached at Kinleith before regulations were issued. It did not 
do this. The need to prevent the l ~eap-frogging which could develop when relativities w~ere 
upset. was cited as another reason for the Kinleith regulations. But the altered rates in this 
case compounded r·elativity problems rather than resolving them. 
It was also made clear that unions would not be allowed to use aUowance claims to gain 
overall increases in ~excess of trend levels. The fr·eight forwarders~ and engine drivers' regula-
tions did prevent the unions concerned from doing this, but it was difficult to d·etermine 
whether it was the means used to obtain the allowances~ or the allowances themselves to 
which the Government objected. Th·erefore, although the Remuneration Act appeared to 
be a mechanism which would enable the ·Government to keep control of wage movements, 
it was not used consistently to a~chiev.e this purpose. The Act was discredited as an instru-
ment of wages policy because it appeared to be used arbitrarily and unfairly . 
The Government was seeking middle ,ground with the Remuneration Act.. Fr~ee wage 
bargaining allowed it too little control; wage controls were too rigid and created pressure 
on the industrial relations system. The solution seemed to be a policy which allowed a 
degr~ee of freedom in wage bargaining, but r~eserved the right for the Government to inter-
vene when circumstances justified this. However, because it was inappropriate to the 
industrial relations environment into which it was introduced, and because of inconsistent 
application, ·selectiv~e intervention failed as a wages control measure. Once it became an 
embarrassment for political and industrial relations reasons, the Remuneration Act could 
therefore be dispensed with from the point of view of economic policy, especially since an 
alternative offered itself in the fo.un of tripartite wage talks. 
The Impact on Industrial Relations 
It appears, both from Government statements and from the way the A·ct was used to 
alter awards, that the Government had three main industrial relations objectives for the 
Remuneration Act: to discourage the use of industrial action in support of wage claims; to 
reduce the influence of militants in the union movement; and to encourage the use of 
arbitration to resolve industrial disputes. 
While the Remuneration Act was in force, the Minister of Labour r~epeat~edly stated the 
Government's view that strike action is not a legitimate weapon in wage bargaining in a 
democracy and that it is harn1ful to the economy. In all four ~cases where the Act was 
threatened or used to int~ervene in an award, the unions had used strike action to for·ce 
their employers to con~cede settlements they had earlier resisted. 
The Government also ~criticized the influenc·e of militants in the unions affected by 
Remuneration Regulations and linked disruptive tactics with the Socialist Unity Party. It 
is noteworthy that officials of the New Zealand Drivers' f ·ederation, the Northern Drivers' 
Union, the Auckland Storemen and Pa~ckers' ·union and the New Zealand Drivers' Union all 
featured on th·e list the Prime Minister issued on 17 March 1980, naming alleged Socialist 
Unity Party members influential in trad~e unions. At the time of the Kinleith dispute, 
Muldoon alleged that the P.arty was uvery close" to the dispute and that the combined 
unions' advocate had been a founder member of the Socialist Unity Party. 
The Government's desire to encourage the use of ''responsible" free wage bargaining 
and conciliation and arbitration rather than strike action to resolve industrial disputes was 
also stated frequently. All of the unions ·engaged in the four disputes were known for their 
reluctance tu use the Arbitration Court. All have a definite 1mpact on the economy when 
they take strike action. These were. in fact. representative of the sorts of unions which ~an 
afford to operate outside th~e conciliation and arbitration system (Woods._ p.21-22 ). 
It appears~ then, that some of the puzzling inconsist ~encies in the Government's applica-
tion of the Remuneration Act to implement its ·wages policy can be explained by its 
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simultaneous use of the Act to mete out industrial relations penalties. A settlement was 
deemed to be excessive only if strike action had been used to reach 1t. Unions were 
irresponsible if they allowed alleged militants to lead them. And, as the saga of the drivers' 
dispute illustrated, the Government did not issue regulations to limit settlements reached 
by arbitration, even when these exceeded what the Government considered reasonable for 
the industry. 
The result of the Government's policy in all three respects was counter-productive. 
Instead of reducing strike action, it provoked the general strike and prolonged the Kinleith 
strike by four weeks. instead of undermining the influence of "militants" it made more 
unionists willing to take "militant" action in the general strike or to support it fmancially 
at K.inleith. Instead of bolstering union confidence in the conciliation and arbitration 
system, it reduced it. Union publications emphasized the fact t~t as long as the Remunera-
tion Act existed, unions could not be sure that the Government would allow the Court to 
arbitrate freely. 
Employers were ambivalent towards the Remuneration Act. The Employers' Federation 
was not sorry to see the end of the general wage order system and the minimum living wage 
proposal. Their preferred wage control mechanism was tripartism but in principle they 
supported the Government's right, even responsibility, to intervene to prevent industrial 
action being used to obtain excessive wage settlements. Because it had no strong feelings 
on the Act, the Employers' Federation played a low-key role in the controversy over it, 
pleading only that employers should not be the innocent victims of the application of the 
Act as they seemed to be following Government intervention in the drivers' and Kinleith 
disputes, and that the Employen' Federation should be consulted before regulations were 
issued. This was ignored. The dispute over the Remuneration Act was essentially one 
between unions and the Government. 
The union movement's industrial struggle against the Act itself began with the Federa-
tion of Labour's special conference on 9 August 1979, which decided to hold stopwork 
meetings to infornt members about the Bill, authorized the Executive to call for national 
action if the Government used its powers, and ordered the Federation of Labour to with-
draw from the Industrial Relations Council because the Government had not consulted the 
council before introducing the Act. The stopwork meetings took place early in September. 
The Combined State Unions also opposed the Act. Member unions used circulars, 
journals and discussions at timely annual conferences to explain the issues to their 
members. The themes of union messages to members about the Remuneration Act were 
simple: the Government is giving itself dictatorial powers; this is an attack on wage and 
salary earners; you and your union could be directly affected. 
When the Prime Minister announced that the drivers' settlement would be reduced by 
regulation, the Meat Workers' Union stopped award negotiations in protest, and stopwork 
meetings in the Wellington Trades Council area called for national action. On 17 
September, the Federation of Labour Executive called a 24 hour general strike for 20 Sep-
tember, which was supported in principle by the Combined State Unions although they 
considered the notice too short. Despite this, the State Services Commission estimated 
that 10 percent of public servants joined the strike. Shops, offices and banks were less 
affected than transport and manufacturing which virtually halted (Roth, 1979, 4(3), p.S). 
Roth believes that at least 300,000 took part and the Chamber of Commerce estimated 
that $80 million worth of production and $37 million in wages were lost as a result. 
(The Evening Post, 21 September 1979, p.4). 
Although it was by no means general, the extent of support for the strike despite the 
notice is a measure both of union hostility to the Act and of the success of the Federation 
of Labour's drive to publicize the dangers of the Act before it was Tho impact may 
also be gauged by the fact that following the strike the Government retreated from its 
threat to use the Act against the driven. -
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relations. Bolger's equivocation over arbitration of the drivers' dispute between September 
21 and 26 and his failure to communicate directly with the parties to the· Kinleith dispute 
earned him considerable criticism. But not only did he have to handle a new portfolio and 
a new Act which was proving very difficult to administer, but he also had to contend with 
the Prime Minister's insistence on retaining the initiative even when overseas for extended 
periods. Bolger's statement that the Government might interfere in an Arbitration Court 
decision on the drivers' dispute has been attributed to telephone calls from Muldoon over-
seas (The Evening Post 27 September 1979, p.1.). It took a special Cabinet meeting and 
some diplomatic explanations by the Acting Prime Minister, Brian Talboys, to resolve that 
impediment to peaceful resolution of the dispute. Bolger also found himself having to 
adopt and incorporate into his own pubUc statements arguments belatedly introduced by 
Muldoon to justify the Kinleith regulations (The Evening Post 4 March 1980, p2). In 
July 1980, Talboys and Bolger were unable to give any commitment to a wages settlement 
in the absence of the Prime _Minister on yet another overseas trip. It was not until Muldoon 
resumed the chair of the talks on 6 August 1980 that an interim settlement (including 
repeal of the Remuneratio~ Act) was possible. 
The President and Secretary of the Federation of Labour were also new to their 
positions when the Remuneration Act was introduced. Knox and Douglas adopted a differ-
ent style of leadership from that of Tom Skinner, Knox's predecessor. It was a deliberate 
.team approach, favouring rank and fde involtement in Federation of Labour activities. 
They shunned the close contacts with the Government favoured by Skinner, and were 
detertnined to intervene in industrial disputes when invited by the unions involved, with 
the primary aim of supporting the just claims of the unions rather than ending the dispute 
as soon as possible. This approach contributed a great deal to their success in handling the 
Kinleith strike and the campaign against the Remuneration Act. But it produced a 
communication gulf between the Government and the union movement which probably 
heightened the conflict and prevented early resolution of disputes by top level negotiation. 
Knox's and Douglas's concentration on establishing the trust of unionists in their 
leadership, rather than on consolidating their personal bargaining relationships with the 
Government, therefore paid dividends by strengthening their positions in the Federation 
of Labour and increasing the effectiveness of the union movement as a political and 
industrial force. 
The new Federation of Labour leadership was also responsive to Combined State 
Unions' efforts to establish closer working relationships between the two organisations. 
Although there were initial difficulties (u with the short notice over the general strike) 
by May 1980 it was possible for them to mount a joint political campaign in defence of 
living standards: for an immediate cost-of-living wage increase, a general wage order system 
and repeal of the Remuneration Act. 
The campaign was co~rdinated centrally but organized through Trades Councils and 
Public Service Association sections (in the absence of a regional Combined State Union 
structure) .... Rank and fde involvement was achieved through meetings, rallies and 
pamphlets, which were used to convey information, rebut Government arguments, attract 
publicity and demonstrate the strength of feeling on the issues. Other tactics susgested in 
literature distributed to unions were to discuss the issues with friends and workmates and 
to send deputations to employen and let ten to Members of Parliament and newspapers. 
The fact that the campaip was politicizing more and more union members as well as 
creating publicity for the union movement made it politically sensible for the Government 
to remove the major stimuli. Once another cost-of-living adjustment had been paid and an 
undertaking given to repeal the Remunemtion Act, early in August 1980, the political 
campaign ended. 
The general strike was also an essentially political tactic - a protest against threa~ed 
use of the Remuneration Act rather than a strike in support of the drivers' right to an 11 
percent increase. Although it failed to bring the country to a halt, most New 
felt its effects. It publicized the islues in a way which had COIIIilllr-.ae impact 
' 
.... ,.... "' ' . ' . ' ~ \ " 
.,.. - free .. llupl•ll w 
9~ p.IS). ae.u. tile Go.._t Ita tile te 
the ..-.. mut it or eao .U, 
to 1111 tll011 powers. 1bil they did in the cue of the 
doll Act. - the fouad itself ill tlaa ~ 
•tiler tedace coatliet, aad that it Wllladaa radalr 
..uol aad suppoit by peaewrJaa witb the Act, It wu foroed to 
Tlda lhoulcl Dot dtlpile the fact that the Gowrnmeat all tile poteadal 
bad Wore the Act was iatroduced. n. 
., .. of thole powen. But iD the proce11 they 
a -at, ia flltUie Gow1111111nta may be ratller more wuy uout provoldaa a eoafi • n:; ,. 
dell whea the is united owr an issue. 
for 
.The Act reflects the growth in the powers of central Govei'IUII8Dt. 
Pell8ltiel were impoled, not for breaches in the law, but for fJf 
a JDY*rY. the Act did not the ia 
be illued, the Gow•mnent could render 
HI lolls with award negotiations which it dtallked, by cuttias back dae 
And tiUa it did. By of Remuaeration it imposecl its wiD oa 
lfODPI which had chosen to act outside the coaciliatloa aad arbitratia 
11 tilly Ml eatltled to do under the lndultrltll Reilltioni.Act 1913. 11ley had Ulld 
wlaicla leaitimate in westem style JadultrW 
1979, p.393). Ia lhort, the Act pw the Gcwe 
wldcla it exerdled . 
Aat the arowth in the power ef tho Mlldlter ia the 
M lloth Mtaiater of aad Mlailter, 
tbe Act aad iaa He used 
dae SoaudtJ Service to obtaia iafo111181ioa 
iD the Act (Da- ENa1rw /Wt 
llfUipl Ia expect to IJe consulted oa impeacltaa 
dilec:tly. epe-.aaaa check 
p.JS). Bat tkere - ao a181ul with Mioa 
Act 11180DRce- and · 
The Employe••' 
ilaued 
far 
it illued 
' ' 't 
" ' 
ancl 
•• 
• 
• 
I 0 Karen Roper 
increase would be made by under whidl bad not even been intro-
duced into Parliament (The Evenllw Polt IS Augut 1979, p.2S). 
Most criticism, however, concentrated on the Act~ reinforce~nent of 
the trend towards government by regulation (Palmer, p.9S-108). that in a 
Parliamentary system regulations should be for machinery purposes only, and that when 
they go beyond that, they are the ideal instruments of despotism (1979, p.313). Yet the 
Remuneration Act gave the Gowmment powen to owrride Ieplation by reauJation. 
The constitutional rectitude of the Minister's apparent announcement of the 
Remuneration Act on natioaal tele¥ilion and radio has also been questioned (Szakats, 
p.390). Two aspects of this arou1ed concern: that the Prime Minister appeared to be 
using the broadcasting media rather than Parliament to announce the introduction of a 
Bill; and that the Government wu using the Broadcasting Corporation as a vehicle for 
political announcements rather than allowing it to operate as an independent branch of 
the media. 
In fact, the Prime Minister made a Ministerial Stateanent to the of Representa-
tives at 7.30 p.m. on 24 July 1979, before broadcasting two hours later. This method of 
announcing policy is itself questionable howewr, because Standing Orders allow the 
Leader of the Opposition to make only non-controwrsial comments in reply to a Minister-
ial Statement (HanSIUd, 1979, p.1763). The Prime Minister's use of broadcasting time on 
30 October 1980 to explain the repeal of the Act was certainly an abuse of the privilege. 
It was made two months after the announcement that the Act would be repealed. The 
broadcast was highly political in content, the 1rime Minister admitting that it was being 
made in response to a challenge from an Opposition Member of Parliament to address the 
nation on repeal of the Act as he had on its announcement. 
lmplicatio~ for the Conciiatioa aad System 
. 
The Remuneration Act and its regulations also threatened the basis of the conciliation 
and arbitration system, which the National Party had pledged to uphold in the 1978 
Manifesto (pp. 27-28). 
Writing in October 1979, Szakats argued that with the Remunemtlon Act such free 
wage bargaining as had ever existed in New Zealand, had come to an end. He pointed out 
that if both voluntary and conciliated collective agreements could be declared invalid by 
Government regulation, "the usefulness of bargaining and ag1eeing collectively or individ-
ually has effectively been destroyed" (p.394). It is tittle wonder that the union movement 
was so hostile to the Act. 
In announcing its intention to replace the Genert1l Wage Orders Act after an application 
had been lodged with the Arbitration Court, the Gowrnment usurped the right of the 
Court to dete1111ine an application properly brought before it (Kirk, p.3S). Comingu this 
did, after a series of amendments to the lnd~~&tritll Reltltioru Act altering the names and 
jurisdictions of the Court, it reinforced uncertainty and waning confidence in lepl 
methods of handling disputed wage claims (Industrilll Rellltiom Review Sept-Oct 1979, 
p.37). 
As Ken Douglas, Secretary of the Federation of Labour, pointed out at the time, the 
Prime Minister's announcement that the Government would not accept an 11 percent 
increase in drivers' wages, the day before the driven' agreement wu to be finalized in 
conciliation, could be interpreted u a breach of Section 146 of the lndustrilll Rellltions 
Act prohibiting the prejudicing of matters before a conciliation council (The EPenln6 Port 
11 September 1979, p.1). This hardly indicates Government respect for the conciliation 
system. 
Nor was the Minister of Labour's statement that the Government might alter the 
Arbitration Court's decision on the driven' likely to convince the partiel that the 
Government respected the Arbitration Court. Althou&h the Gowrnment's acceptanoe of 
the Court's decision on 5 October 1979 wu r-urilll, reJaliDed Seetlon 6(6) of the 
Remuneration Act, which obJiled the Court ad to ollllne till of aay 
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